16

CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Pasadena, California 91109

ETHNICITY AND MODERNIZATION
IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

Robert H. Bates

Social Science Working Paper

Number 16

November 1972

ETHNICITY AND MODERNIZATION
IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

Robert H. Bates

I

Geertz, Melson and Wolpe, Huntington and others have argued that modernization promotes potentially disintegrative forces in developing areas, and, in particular, often gives rise to powerful ethnic groupings.[1] In this article, we elaborate this hypothesis in the context of the developing nations of black Africa. In so doing, we also attempt to demonstrate the relevance and usefulness to political scientists of the extensive work on modernization in Africa produced by students of related disciplines, and to draw from these studies evidence for our principal assertion: that in contemporary Africa, modernization and ethnic competition can and do covary.

The first part of the paper is definitional: we clarify our usage of the major terms of our argument. The second part is evidential: drawing on the social science literature from Africa, we attempt to demonstrate that the goods of modernity are desired but scarce; that modernization therefore creates new patterns of stratification; and that both these phenomena engender patterns of ethnic competition in Africa. We then move to our basic problem of explanation. Given that modernization promotes competition, why is it that this competition assumes ethnic form?

In seeking answers to this question, we devote two sections of the paper to the formation and persistence of ethnic groupings. In the last section of the paper, we move to the task of specification. We argue that ethnic competition can be present in varying degrees, culminating in ethnic violence; and we seek to specify the circumstances under which the different intensities of competition may emerge.

II

The major terms of our argument are modernity, modernization, ethnic competition, and ethnic group.

In keeping with conventional usage, we define modernity operationally and call those nations more modern which attain higher levels on the following variables: education, per capita income, urbanization, political participation, industrial employment, and media participation. In practice, we will restrict our attention to the first three of these variables. We feel justified in using a single term--modernity--to refer to these distinct variables, for it has been repeatedly demonstrated that they are highly interrelated and that their interrelation derives from their tapping a single underlying dimension.[2]

Modernization we define as the process of attaining modernity. While modernity may be a highly interrelated and coherent set of variables--a system, as Lerner states--modernization is an incremental process. It takes the form of successive attempts to maximize the specific variables that comprise modernity. From the point of view of those who are modernizing, modernization is represented by the striving for more plentiful and better paying jobs, the search for urban employment, the creation of fellowships for more education, the issuance of trading licenses, and the quest for a host of other immediate benefits.

By ethnic competition, we mean the striving by ethnic groups for valued goods which are scarce in comparison to the demand for them. Our definition of an ethnic group is, perforce, complex. In using the term, we refer to a set of people who organize common activities, be they social (e.g. age-grade initiations), economic (e.g. cattle herding), or political (e.g. organizing behind a common candidate); who have the conviction that they share common interests and a common fate; and who have devised a cultural symbolism expressing their cohesiveness as a group. One factor that distinguishes ethnic groups is the cultural symbolism which they employ: it is characterized by collective myths of origin; the assertion of ties of kinship or blood, be they real or putative; a mythology expressive of the cultural uniqueness or superiority of the group; or a conscious elaboration of its language and heritage. Ethnic groups also differ from other groups in their composition: they include persons from every stage of life and every socio-economic level.[3]

It is important to note that ethnic groups need not be tribes. By our usage, the term tribe denotes a group bound by traditional political structures, to which people are linked by the mechanisms of traditional political obligation. Ethnic groups need not be based on traditional political institutions; rather, many are based upon newly created political organizations, forged in the competitive environment of the modern era.

Moreover, the boundaries of ethnic groups may not be dictated by the tradition at all. Rather, ethnic groups are dynamic groups which use and redefine tradition in a manner dictated by contemporary necessities; thus, persons from separate tribes may in the modern era be allied with a single ethnic coalition, and the history of their past relations be reinterpreted to support the alliance.

III

Modernity is a cluster of desired goods. This is not to state that it is uncritically accepted, nor that African people do not becry the obvious costs of modernization. The development of such philosophies as Negritude, Humanism, and the multitidinous versions of African Socialism by African intellectuals, and the spread of urban prophet churches and anti-witchcraft movements among some of the African masses, suggests the sensitivity of many to the costs of modernization.[4] Nevertheless, it is obvious that the components of modernity are strongly desired.

The desire for modernity: The widespread demand of Africans for education has been amply documented; the promise of universal primary education is a political necessity in most African states.[5] Africans have demonstrated a willingness to alter life-styles and social structures in pursuit of higher incomes. For example, Scudder and Colson have documented the transition of one isolated and impoverished community, the Gwembe Tonga of Zambia, through three major agricultural systems;[6] the agricultural transition of the Kipsigis and Kikuyu are well known;[7] so too is the

wholesale adoption of new cash crops by the Baganda. In a discussion of the most renowned deviant case, the Masai, Gulliver persuasively argues that their "backward" behavior is consistent with income maximization. The economic benefits of modernity are not rejected, he contends; rather, they simply are not certain enough to warrant the potential costs of change.[8] Studies of the flows of labor migrants in Africa also document our point. The overwhelming consensus of students of this phenomenon is that the cause of these migrations is the desire for employment and the income it makes possible. As stated by Gulliver: "the incentives to labor migrants are primarily and preeminently a desire for cash and material wealth which are not available at home. . . ."[9]

The desire for modernity is also evidenced in the rapid expansion of urban areas in Africa. The rate of expansion is truly impressive. According to available figures, the least rapidly urbanizing state in Africa, Gambia, nonetheless experienced a 142% increase in its urban population between 1955-1965, an increase of at least three times its rate of population growth. For the most rapidly urbanizing nation, Malawi, the rate of increase was 617% over the same time period.[10] Of all the modernizing trends in Africa, the growth of the cities has perhaps been the most extensively studied. While most studies report that the influx of urban migrants represents a search for higher incomes, recently collected materials lend greater credence to a popular hypothesis that has often been denigrated by scholars of the phenomenon: that

urbanization also represents a quest for the modern style of life which money can buy.[11]

Competition for modernity: The desire for the components of modernity in Africa is thus fully as incontrovertable as are the dissatisfactions to which modernity gives rise. Modernity is valued; equally as important, the goods it represents are scarce in proportion to the demand for them. The inevitable result is that people compete for these goods and for control over the agencies which promote and direct the process of modernization.

This competition is best illustrated in the competition for income and for several of the resources which create wealth: land, markets, and jobs. In the agricultural societies of Africa, particularly where the population is dense, the penetration of a money economy gives rise to an intense competition for land. As Colson states: "By themselves such changes had an impact on local systems of land rights as men began to evaluate the land they used in new ways. They also led to an increasing number of legal battles over land; for men were encouraged to establish long-term rights in particular holdings either for immediate use or for subsequent gain."[12] While much of the competition for land is intra-ethnic, much of it is inter-ethnic as well. Polly Hill has published accounts of several major inter-ethnic land disputes in Ghana.[13] The dispute between the Kikuyu and Masai over control of the former white highlands has created a major cleavage in the political life of Kenya.[14] And a major source of urban conflict is the tension between those indigenous ethnic groups who

have alientate their lands and those immigrant groups who have benefited from the occupation of urban real estate.[15]

The competition for control of trade is equally intense. One of the best analyses of this phenomenon is by Abner Cohen who documents the intensive rivalry between the Yoruba and Hausa for control over first the Kola trade and then the long distance trade in cattle in Nigeria. G.I. Jones describes the 19th Century competition for control over trading routes to the interior along the Southern Coast of Nigeria and P.C. Lloyd documents the rivalry between Itsekiri and Urhobo for marketing facilities in Warri.[16] Such conflicts characterize Eastern Africa as well.[17] One need only note the pervasive rivalry between blacks and Asians for control over commerce; specific instances of competition, as between Bagandan and Indian traders in Kampala and Luo and Asian shopkeepers in Kisumu, have been well documented, as have the consequences for the emergence of ethnic groupings.[23]

Equally as pervasive is the competition for jobs. Parkin discusses the rivalry between Luo and Baganda for employment in the industrial and service sectors of Kampala; Grillo, in his analysis of the East African Railways, notes a similar rivalry between Luo and Abaluhya.[18] Competition for urban employment has been noted between the Bamiléké and Douala in the Cameroons; between Nyanja and Bemba speakers on the copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia; between indigenous Africans and strangers in Abidjan; and between Kasai Baluba and Bena

Lulua in Kasai province in the Congo.[19] Exacerbating these tensions has been the expansion of the production of educated employables at a rate in excess of the expansion of job opportunities, a phenomenon that has been extensively studied in Ghana, Nigeria, and elsewhere.[20]

Modernity and stratification: Not only does modernization thus create competition. But also, because the elements of modernity are valued and scarce, they form the basis of a new stratification system in Africa. This is not to state that traditional criteria of social ranking are totally relinquished; indeed, all evidence is to the contrary, and we shall argue that the interplay between the two stratification systems is crucially significant in explaining the emergence of ethnic groups in the modern era. Nonetheless, those who are educated, wealthy, and dwell in cities, and who possess the power derived from competence in the modern sector, can successfully claim higher social rank in contemporary African society than those who lack these attributes.

The creation of a new stratification systems is documented in studies of occupational prestige in Africa. These studies find that modern roles, such as those of the teacher or clerk, are given high prestige and that in fact they are generally ranked higher than the roles of traditional societies, such as those of craftsman or hunter. The results of these studies go beyond suggesting that modern occupations are prestigeful, however, to emphasising that modern conceptions

of stratification are being utilized by African peoples. Thus, several studies report a close correspondence between the ranking of occupations by Europeans and Africans; Foster, for example, finds a correlation of +. 88 between the prestige rankings of occupations by Ghanaian and American samples, while Hicks reports a correlation of +. 80 between the rankings of occupations by African and white pupils in Zambia.[21] Xydias reports occupational rankings by Africans in the Congo which correspond closely to those produced in the more developed countries.[22] And Hicks, in another study of occupational prestige in Zambia, finds the criteria for the rankings to be similar to those reported in industrialized societies. The prestige of an occupation can largely be accounted for, he indicates, by the degree of responsibility, service value, income, education, and the nature of the working conditions associated with it.[23]

The numerous studies of elite formation in Africa also suggest that those who possess the attributes of modernity can successfully lay claim to high status in many indigenous societies. This has been amply documented in the primarily agricultural societies of West Africa. Thus, Lloyd, in a series of articles notes the rise of wealthy traders and educated clerical workers as a new elite in Yoruba society; Austin discusses the same phenomenon among the Ashanti and, like Lloyd, documents the conflicts between the new elite and the traditional ruling classes.[24] The same pattern appears in the agricultural societies of East Africa as well.

Studies of the Gisu, Chagga, Luo and Abaluhya report how the spread of education and cash cropping generated new groups of literates and wealthy traders and how these new segments of the population successfully lay claim to elite status.[25] In the urban areas, too, education, wealth and an occupation in the modern sector, be it administrative or industrial, represent entitlements to elite status; this is documented for Ibadan, Kisangani, Kinshasa, and Jos at the very least.[26]

Stratification and competition: Crucial to the emergence of ethnic competition is that societies as well as individuals tend to be evaluated along the dimension of modernity. Those groups which are more wealthy, better educated, and more urbanized tend to be envied, resented, and sometimes feared by others; and the basis for these sentiments is the recognition of their superior position in the new system of stratification. Thus, for example, in Calabar, the indigenous Efik took readily to education, while the immigrant Ibo lacked both education and the wealth which would follow; the result was tension and hostility, sentiments which were exacerbated by the Ibo's attempts to close the gap.[27] This case finds its parallel in the famed rivalry between the Ibo and Yoruba. Exposed to education at an earlier date, prosperous because of cocoa, and the indigenous people of the urban areas which became the primary locus of administrative and industrial development, the Yoruba claimed top rank in the modern society of Nigeria. The envy of the Ibo, and the tensions which resulted from their attempts to catch up with the Yoruba,

are too well known to warrant detailed discussion here. So too with the northern peoples of Nigeria; their fear of the superiority of the southern peoples in the modern sector led them to an explicit policy of "northernization" whereby they gave privileged access to educational and employment opportunities to residents of the north. Their unequal status in modern society led another point of conflict with the southerners, this time over the date of self-government in Nigeria. As related for the Birom: "Birom leaders expressed unease at the thought of rapid achievement of selfgovernment--in fact at the idea of selfgovernment before the Birom have produced enough professional men and traders and artisans to be able to claim all the occupations of control which exist in their division."[28] As a result, the Birom aligned with the Northern Peoples Congress instead of with one of the several southern parties which were competing for their allegiance, for the Congress favored a later date for self-government.

The pattern of rivalry for equality along the modern dimension finds its parallel in the competition between the Itsekiri and Urhobo in Warri; the Ijebu and Ibandan Yoruba in Ibadan; the Bakongo and Bangala in Leopoldville; and the Baluba and Bena Lulua in Kasai.[29] The pattern of political alignments is paralleled throughout Africa. Thus, for example, the less developed pastoralists less fervently pressed for self-government in Kenya than did the agriculturalists; and when they saw that their efforts were to fail, they sought to fragment power through a

federal constitution. The pastoralists feared the perpetuation of the disparity between themselves and the more educated, urbanized, and wealthy agriculturalists which would result were Kenya to become independent under the political control of the agriculturalist tirbes. This conflict was perhaps the major basis for the split between KANU and KADU in Kenya.[30] The political alignments in West African politics, such as in the Cameroons, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, are amenable to similar treatment. In these cases too party conflict tended to parallel the split between the more modernized residents, generally in the coastal areas, and the less modernized peoples, generally dwelling in the hinterlands.[31] Similarly in Uganda, where the UPC represented a coalition of less modernized ethnic groups in common opposition to the prospects of a Baganda hegemony.[32] As Zolberg succintly states: "Many [of the changes introduced under colonial rule] have reinforced old differntiations between tribes by adding to them new ones based on modern attributes, such as wealth and education."[33] "On the whole political activity has mirrored ethnic antagonisms that continue to prevail between groups."[34] And as one Nigerian commentator states:

> Tribalism, then, exists when members of tribal groups must compete as groups for places in the class, status and power systems of the new nation. In a manner of speaking . . . it is a form of social indecision regarding the strategy of equitable distribution of . . . advantages available to people in the new African nations.[35]

The political conflicts associated with the competition for modernity are intensified by the desire of ethnic groups to establish congruence between their "modernity status" and the political status positions.[36] The goods of modernity are scarce,and as a result the less modernized persons tend to be in the majority. Put another way, there is a disparity between modernity status -- as measured by education, income, and urban dwelling -- and political power -- as determined by numbers. The result of this disparity is a feverish attempt by the leaders of the less modernized peoples to convert their majority position into political control over the allocation of modern resources and thereby enhance their position in the modern sector. A second result is the fear of the loss of power by the more modernized peoples. The consequence is strain and tension, as the majority converts numbers into power and power into the attainment of modern benefits.[37] As studies of Zanzibar, Rwanda, Uganda, and Nigeria indicate, this process of attempted restratification can rapidly lead to violence.[38]

IV

The basic question that arises from this discussion is: Why should the competition for the components of modernity and for status positions as defined by modernity involve ethnic groups at all? At least two answers can be given to this question. The first is that both the distribution of modernity and ethnic groups tends to be governed

by the factor of space. Where modernization takes place often largely determines who gets modernized. The second is that it is often useful for those engaged in the competition for modernity to generate and mobilize the support of ethnic groupings.

The factor of space: It is the geographers who most forcefully portray the spatial patterns of modernization. Originating in "nodes" or "central places," modernity then spreads or "diffuses" into the more remote regions of the territory, they report. They also demonstrate that the level of modernity slopes downward with distance, with the central places being the most modernized, the proximate areas being the next most developed, and the hinterlands lagging behind.[39] While there is considerable debate over whether territoriality is a required component of the definition of an ethnic group, there is no denying that the members of an ethnic group tend to cluster in space; nor can it be questioned but that colonial policy made every attempt to assign ethnic groups to stable and rigidly defined areas. The result of this correspondence in spatial orderings is that those ethnic groups which are most proximate to the locus of the impact of modernity tend to be the most modernized; and thus the competition for the benefits of modernity and for status positions in the modern sector can become organized on ethnic lines.

The evidence for this assertion is persuasive. Soja, in his analysis of modernization in Kenya, finds that the Kikuyu, being proximate

to Nairobi and the highlands, are the most urbanized and educated, and among the more wealthy of the ethnic groups in Kenya.[40] Similarly, Coleman and Abernethy argue that the initial advantage of the Yoruba in Nigeria derived from their proximity to Lagos and from the early establishment of missions in Lagos and Abeokuta. The Ibo, being more remote from these areas, were initially less exposed to the centers of modernization; and being less proximate to the locus of mission activity, they lagged badly in the attainment of education and well-paying jobs.[41] The preeminence of the Baganda, as well as the tensions which have resulted, have also been explained in terms of their proximity to the administrative capital and largest town in Uganda. As one analyst reports:

> in Uganda (with the possible exception of the southeastern area) geographical distance from the capital city is sufficient to provide a rough indicator of the degree of modernity. Most Ugandans are fully aware that the Baganda profited more than others from their close proximity to the administrative center of the country.[42]

So pervasive a phenomenon does this appear that spatial proximity is sometimes offered as an alternative to classic notions of "cultural receptivity" in explaining differing rates of change. Thus, Kasfir, discussing Apter's structural-cultural theory of modernization in Buganda, notes that given the proximity of the Baganda to Kampala, the "argument . . . cannot be proved or disproved . . . ."[43] And Gugler, in discussing the general resistance of pastoralists to the forces of change, comments that "the underlying more general factor [is] probably that many of these are difficult of access to schools and administration alike."[44]

Space, administration, and the incentive to organize: We have noted that colonial policy, and in particular indirect rule, ensured the correspondence between levels of modernity and ethnic membership, primarily by reinforcing the permanency of the spatial boundaries of ethnic groups. Colonial policy had another effect: it furnished an incentive to the formation of ethnic organizations. The local administration, whatever its faults, served as one of the primary agents of modernization in Africa. And the colonial powers, by delineating administrative boundaries along "tribal" lines, made it in the interests of their subjects to organize ethnic groupings so as to gain control over the administrative mechanisms which themselves controlled the process of modernization.

This assertion is best demonstrated in the studies of one of the primary source of income in Africa, land. Colson notes that colonial policy produced two contradictory developments in land law. On the one hand, the growth of the cash economy furnished an incentive for individual ownership; on the other, the dominant mythology of the colonial administration, that land was "communally owned," restricted permanent rights to land to the members of the local ethnic group.[46] A clear implication of Colson's analysis is that as the benefits of land ownership increased, as they did with the spread of cash cropping, so did the importance of retaining and affirming membership in ethnic groups. The political consequences of this rapidly became evident in the conduct of the local councils in which jurisdiction over land rights had in part been vested.

The local councils began to function as ethnic organizations, legislating so as to protect the benefits brought to the local population by the modernization process. Thus, Coleman reports that with the appreciation of land values, councils in Owerri, Ibadan, Benin, Idoma, Tiv, and Igala in Nigeria restricted access to land to the local ethnic group and divested strangers of the rights of permanent tenure. In this way, the material benefits to be derived from the land were channeled to the local residents and indigenous ethnic group.[46]

The power of the local administration over economic resources extended beyond the control of land tenure to such other matters as access to markets and market stalls, the regulation of crop production and animal husbandry, the construction of roads for the export of produce, and etc. At the behest of those who had the greatest stake in the modern economy, often organized in "improvement unions," many councils acted so as to bias the distribution of these resources for the benefit of the local population and away from immigrant strangers. Thus, La Fontaine reports that local leaders sought to distribute roads and payments to coffee growers around Mbale so as to benefit Gisu cash croppers exclusively. Lonsdale documents the attempts by the Kavirondo local councils to restrict access to markets to Abaluhya and Luo merchants and to alter agricultural regulations for the benefit of Abaluhya and Luo cash croppers; both actions were in opposition to Asians and Europeans. And Lloyd, in his discussion of Urhobo and Itsekiri rivalry in municipal elections in Warri, notes that

"It was said during the 1955 election campaigns that whichever tribe won the election would restrict the lease of stalls to its own members and thus give them a monopoly of the trade in the town."[47]

Given the power of the local administration over the distribution of the benefits of modernity, and given the correspondence between administrative and ethnic boundaries, it was therefore natural that those who sought to modernize would create politically cohesive ethnic groupings. The demand of ethnic groups for their own districts and councils represents the logical culmination of this process, for by securing this demand they can more perfectly ensure the diversion of the benefits of modernity to the members of their own group.

The behavior of the moderns: A second reason for the formation of ethnic groups is that in the competition for the benefits of modernity, it has been in the interests of the most modern elements to sponsor the growth of "traditional" consciousness in Africa.[48] That the modern elements took the initiative in organizing "traditional" groupings is extensively documented in the literature.

The "educateds" often were the founders of ethnic unions. Thus, Lonsdale speaks of "the Christian establishment" of mission-trained literates who helped to form the Kavirondo Taxpayers Welfare Association. Twaddle writes of the "'new men' created by missionary education" who helped to form the Young Bagwere Association. And the role of the former mission students in organizing the independent schools among the Kikuyu and promoting ethnic

consciousness in that tribe has been discussed by many authors.[49] In terms of income, it is often those who are better-off by dint of their occupations in the modern sector--the clerks, cash croppers, and traders--who form ethnic unions. Thus, for example, Ottenberg notes that it was those who "work as clerks for the local British Administration, who teach in local schools, who work for traders, or who are traders themselves" who founded ethnic unions among the Afikpo Ibo.[50] Sklar notes that both the Egbe Omo Oduduwa and Ibo State Union "were created by representatives of the new and rising class--lawyers, doctors, businessmen, civil servants . . . ."[51] And George Bennett notes that the Bahaya Union was led largely by relatively prosperous cash croppers and members of cooperative societies whose economic interests were threatened by the government's policies toward coffee cultivation and land management.[52]

The role of urban dwellers in the formation of ethnic unions stands out most clearly in the literature from West Africa. There, ethnic unions were most often formed in urban centers and only later exported to the rural areas whose names they often bore. As stated by Offodile: "It is significant to observe that almost all the tribal unions now existing in Nigeria were found, not in the very towns of the tribes represented, but outside their own villages, and sometimes outside their own tribal

territories . . . ."[53] Thus, it was in Lagos where the Ibo came into competition with the Yoruba and where Ibo tribal consciousness was formed. It was in Leopoldville that Abako was founded; only later was it exported to the majority of the Bakongo in the surrounding rural territories.[54] And even in the case of such minor tribal unions as the Afikpo Town Welfare Association, the origin of the organization lay in the city: "An educated Afikpo man working at a trade-union post in Aba, who had travelled widely in the course of his work . . . realized the need for a protective union to aid Afikpo people . . . . At his own expense he had 400 membership cards printed to organize Afikpo people . . . ."[55]

There were numerous motivations for the formation of these unions but one stands out: the perception by the moderns that they must organize collective support to advance their position in the competition for the benefits of modernity, something to which we now turn.

Competition and ethnic consolidation: We have noted that there are good reasons for one ethnic group to be more advanced than another; in part, the spatial diffusion of modernization makes this inevitable. We have also noted the forces that can account for an ethnic group consolidating itself into a position of advantage. For one, because modernity creates status differentiation, the members of an advantaged ethnic group are motivated to defend their leading position; they devise methods for retaining their privileged positions, such as by biasing local council legislation in the ways we have described. Secondly, because modernity is desired, the less

favored members of an ethnic group place immense pressure on their more advantaged brothers to share the benefits derived from their advanced positions. Thus, family loyalties are activated to secure jobs;[56] the income of the more prosperous is claimed by kin, often to meet school fees that will in turn secure future prosperity;[57] and urban dwellers find their households being used by country folk in search of urban employment.[58] Under the pressure of the less advantaged, a sense of obligation resembling that usually extended to immediate kin is thus broadened to include fellow village dwellers and even persons from other villages and districts; and the language of relationships, such as the use of putative kin terms, is broadened to suggest this expansion. The result of these pressures is that the more advantaged members of the group are forced to draw into their sphere others of their kind. And the social climbing less advantaged generate a mythology of consanguity in search of modern benefits. The initially advantaged group thus consolidates itself in the modern sector and comes to view itself as an ethnic grouping in the process.

The result of this process of consolidation is to create among the members of other groups a sense of threat and disadvantage. In the competition for jobs, it is the more modern elements of these groups who most directly experience this threat and perceive it in ethnic terms. They come to understand that they are placed at a disadvantage by their inability to activate the sense of ethnic obligation so as to gain access to the modern sector. Moreover, they perceive that their individual

progress is closely determined by the collective standing of their group; they therefore initiate programs of collective advancement in response.

The creation of ethnic support by the competitors for jobs has been noted by Grillo in his analysis of the Railway African Union in Uganda. High office in the Union often led to promotion to more advanced jobs in the railway company, and so was much desired by railway employees. In order to enhance their mobility prospects by gaining union office, candidates would sometimes make appeals to tribal loyalty. As stated by Grillo, "Although those seeking office . . . may have little sense of tribal interest, tribalism may be one of the weapons used in the struggle . . . ."[59] A similar pattern has been noted in Kenya, where accusations are made regarding the "Kikuyuization" of the government services and ethnic pressures mounted by the leaders of the less advanced groups in protest over job discrimination.[60] However, the most striking illustration of the creation of ethnic action is to be found in West Africa. Perceiving that their individual fate in the struggle for modernity was tied to the collective standing of people from their own areas, the most modern members of the less modernized groups organized large scale programs of advancement among their people. David Abernethy furnished the best discussion of the phenomenon:

> The struggle for employment was bound to produce frustration, and those not chosen for the best jobs found it easy to blame their plight on the advantages possessed by members of other groups. Of course, different groups clearly did have differential access to education, which in turn was the key to job mobility . . . .

> What was the best course of action open to the urban migrant who was acutely concerned lest his ethnic group fall behind others in the struggle . . . ? Certainly the rural masses had to be informed of the problem. If the masses were not aware of their ethnicity, then they would have to learn who they really were through the efforts of "ethnic missionaries" returning to the homeland. These "missionaries" would also have to outline a strategy by which the ethnic group, once fully conscious of its unity and its potential, could compete with its rivals. Clearly the competition required enrolling more children in school, particularly at the secondary level, for the graduates of a good local secondary school would be assured of rapid . . . mobility within modern society . . . .[61]

In this manner, Abernethy accounts for the formation of ethnic unions among the Ibibio, Ibo and Urhobo in Nigeria.

A similar pattern obtains in the political process, save that the stakes are higher. Not only is power itself at stake, but also the benefits which power can bring: control over the distribution of modernity itself.

There can be no doubt but that electoral competition arouses ethnic conflict. The tensions arising from the 1964 elections in Nigeria were one of the precipitates of civil war in that country; over a dozen years earlier, ethnically based parties were formed to contest the first general elections in that country.[62] Similarly, the primary instruments of the virulent ethnic conflict in the Congo were the numerous political parties formed by politicians to contest the 1960 national elections.[63] Elections, or anticipation of them, has also precipitated ethnic conflict in Zanzibar, Rwanda, and Ghana.[64] Zambia represents another interesting case. As suggested in the sociology of the colonial period in Zambia,

there was an absence of ethnic conflict which was puzzling when viewed in a comparative perspective; indeed, the seeming absence stimulated many of the outstanding pieces of research on the phenomenon. Nonetheless, ethnic conflict has emerged in Zambia, and its parantage can be traced to electoral politics. The division between the Tonga-Ila-Lenje cluster and the rest of the country arose with the elections of 1959; and the subsequent splits between the Lozi and Bemba, and the Nyanja speakers and Bemba speakers, clearly date to the intra-UNIP elections of August 1967 and the general elections of December 1968.[65]

Perhaps the main reason for these conflicts is that in the competition for power, ethnic appeals are useful to politicians. Given that most constituencies tend to be dominated by the members of one ethnic group--a result of the politics of apportionment and delimitation--an ethnic appeal is an attractive and efficacious weapon in the competition for office. Moreover, because ethnic groups contain persons of all occupations, socio-economic background, life styles, and positions in the life cycle, the appeal of common ethnicity can generate unified support where other issues would be divisive. As a result, in the competition for power, and for the benefits of modernity and the prestige it confers, politicians will stimulate the formation of competitively aligned ethnic groups. As stated by Sklar: "It is less frequently recognized that tribal movements may be created and instigated into action by the new men of power in furtherance of their own special interests . . . ."[66]

Naturally, this is not to state that the politicians are alone to blame for the rise of ethnic conflict. Indeed, while they do instigate ethnic conflicts, they often behave like captives of the forces which they helped to create. This leads us to the next question with which we plan to deal in this paper: Having accounted for the formation of ethnic groups, how can we explain their persistence?

V

Ethnic groups persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and services from the modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their members for the components of modernity. Insofar as they provide these benefits to their members, they are able to gain their support and achieve their loyalty.

The capacity of ethnic groups to extract goods and services from the modern sector is best demonstrated in their relationship with those who have achieved positions of prominence in that sector. Ethnic groups exert powerful social pressures upon the modern elite in order to satisfy the demands of their members. Perhaps the most persuasive evidence for these assertions is the reaction of the modern elite itself. Its members experience their positions not only as privileged but also as onerous; they feel that they are at the center of tremendous social pressures. As Victor Uchendu states: "My town demanded leadership from me. But this leadership is a trying as well as a thankless experience.

My town has a passionate desire 'to get up.'"[67] Mainza Chona, currently Vice-President of the Republic of Zambia, argues the same point: modern leaders are subject to concerted pressures and forced to act as spokesmen for ethnic interests. Rather than blaming members of the national elite for instigating "tribalism," he states, the citizens of Zambia should blame the "local leaders in the villages and towns" who "travel . . . to Lusaka to meet leaders" in order to urge them to serve parochial interests. Chona concludes:

> Unless the local leaders in the villages and towns stop being competitive against other groups and begin to regard top leaders as national leaders we shall not find a lasting solution to [the problem of tribalism].[68]

The demands upon the modern elite are predictable. Characteristically, they contain demands for material resources: financial contributions from the moderns for the construction of new facilities and for the creation of educational funds. Some groups even levy taxes upon their more prosperous urban members.[69] The members of ethnic groups also seek advice on how to better their incomes. In response, ethnic groups retain members of the modern elite as "economic advisers . . . to instruct their members in the ups and downs of trade; they have also advised in favour of joint stock enterprise. Different fields of trade are surveyed and analyzed for the benefit of the members . . . "[70] The demands of ethnic groups are also for service: the use of the skills of the moderns, be they technical, educational, or political, on behalf of "their people."

The capacity of ethnic groups to extract goods and services from the modern elite derive from several sources. They control the allocation of strong inducements. For example, because elite skills are a desired commodity, ethnic groups are able to win the use of these skills by making their acquisition contingent upon ethnic service. Thus, Lloyd reports for the Itsekiri that "several lawyer-politicians who were sent to England with community funds are expected on their return to repay the debt either in cash . . . or by winning tangible benefits for their people."[71] Other inducements include prestige: symbols of status are conferred or withdrawn by ethnic groups in recognition of services performed by the group. Thus, Plotnicov documents the conferral of status by ethnic groups in Jos; members of the modern elite, he writes

> have the skills for dealing with government and the wider community. Their knowledge in legal and economic matters, secretarial and bookkeeping procedures, and their general sophistication in modern and urban affairs is indispensible. Their value to the ethnic group . . . [is] recognized through the granting of high . . . offices . . . and sometimes . . titles as well, which further reinforce the modern elite's powers . . . ."[72]

Ethnic groups also possess strong sanctions, most notably the capacity to withdraw elite status. This is vividly revealed in the political sector, where, for example, in recent elections the Luo, Sukuma, and Lozi turned out of office several of their most renowned political leaders, some of cabinet rank. The reported reason for the imposition of these sanctions was the elite's failure to serve local interests.[73]

There is another reason for the ability of ethnic groups to extract goods and services from the incumbents of the modern sector. For many moderns, what is prestigeful is still defined in terms of traditional criteria. For many, modernity becomes a resource which they utilize to attain prestige within the traditional sector.

Evidence for the continued presence of traditional notions of stratification is contained in the very studies which emphasise the preeminence of modern stratification systems. Thus, for example, Hicks finds that the standard deviation of the ranking of modern occupations by Africans is higher than that of the rankings by Europeans; he attributes this in part to the use by Africans of two sets of stratification criteria, one traditional and the other modern.[74] Similarly, Foster found that Ghanaians give higher ranks to traditional political offices--chiefs and councillors--than they give to many modern occupations "despite the fact that often holders of these [offices] had little education and received little . . . pay. Clearly the respondents in Foster's study were using at least two dimensions to rate the full list of occupations: one being the western dimension and the other a traditional dimension."[75]

The acceptance of traditional stratification patterns leads many moderns to convert their success in the modern sector into prestige in the traditional order by utilizing their wealth to obtain prestigeful positions in their ethnic groupings. Many studies cite the purchasing of traditional

titles by the successful entrants into the modern sector.[76] Others note the use of wealth to purchase traditional offices.[77] Still others record the use of income derived in the modern sector to practice clientage and to finance large-scale traditional ceremonies, both of which are conventional means of enhancing one's standing in the traditional order. As Balandier states:

> [a wealthy person] can make "sociological investments"; in this case, he uses new economic conditions to achieve or to reinforce a traditional type of prominence. The size of his "clientele" and the extension of his generosity will reveal his degree of success; his profit will be expressed in prestige and authority . . . the economic "game" is still only a method to achieve goals determined by the old social and cultural system.[78]

The ethnic groups are thus able to extract goods and services from their members in the modern sector. We have already indicated how they use this capacity to satisfy the demands of their members for the components of modernity: income, education, and urban employment. The result of this process is the generation of political support. Thus, as Sklar notes, the tribally dominated parties of Nigeria seized power at the regional level where:

> The regional party leaders operated highly effective systems of patronage, dispensing jobs, contracts, commerical loans, . . . and scholarships. Young people in all parts of the country were pressured in various ways to support the regional government parties. . . . Opinion follows interest, and many young adults furthered their careers by adopting regionalist principles and tribalist ideologies.[79]

Related to our point is a last observation: that ethnic groups represent a successful mechanism for generating expanding benefits in

the modern era. We have repeatedly alluded to the various components of modernity--income, education, and urbanization--and noted how ethnic groups are created as part of the process of attaining them. What we wish to stress here is that many ethnic groups, and in particular those that span the rural and urban sectors, combine these components into a mutually reinforcing system--one that produces expansion and growth and therefore increasing payoffs. We represent this system as follows:



We have already noted the major linkages in this system. We have also noted the manner in which ethnic groups furnish these linkages, by organizing cash cropping, education, and job placement, and by channeling the benefits of urban employment into the rural sector in the form of economic advice, remittances, and educational programs. Here we need but stress the phenomenon of "positive feedback" that perpetuates this system. To emphasise but one kind of evidence for this feedback, we mention the studies by Caldwell. He notes that those rural families which are wealthier tend to generate more educateds; that the educateds are more prone to migrate; and that they therefore obtain higher incomes.[80] He also notes that the families which contribute toward education fees get

back more money from the educateds than they contributed in the first place.[81] As a result, the income of the rural families expands even more and the cycle continues. As we have noted, in some cases, ethnic organizations establish these feedbacks, and in other cases they lay hold of them and institutionalize them. In both cases, they have helped to organize the components of modernity into the system of modernity described by Lerner and Deutsch. That ethnic groups have devised organizations which enable them to cope with, and indeed utilize and benefit from, the process of modernization helps to explain why they have prospered in the modern era. For insofar as they serve the demonstratedly strong demands of the African peoples for modernization, they can win their support and thereby gain a heightened capacity to persist.

VI

We wish to suggest that there are levels of intensity of ethnic competition and that ethnic competition takes place to varying degrees. In the first degree, there is non-political competition, that is, competition for the scarce benefits created in the modernization process. In the second degree, ethnic competition becomes politicised; not only do groups compete for the scarce resources, but they also compete for the control over the allocation of these resources. In the third degree, and one we have not discussed up to now, political competition intensifies to the level of conflict; at this level, coercion and violence are introduced into ethnic relations.

In this section, we seek to suggest the factors that influence the intensity of ethnic competition.

The Emergence of Ethnic Competition

The arena of the competition for modernity is most often the urban center; but not all towns in Africa are similar in their structure, and their differing structures appear to influence the probability with which the competition for modernity transforms into ethnic competition. Several major factors appear to promote this transformation. These include:

1. The degree to which the town is numerically dominated by a single major ethnic group. Characteristically, numerical dominance leads the modern elites of minority groups to form ethnic organizations as a means for protecting and advancing their position in the modern urban sector.

2. The degree to which the majority group dominates the town politically. Insofar as the town is governed by the traditional political institutions of the major ethnic group, the elites of the minority ethnic group feel even more threatened in the competition for modernity, and therefore seek to form ethnic groups to protect and promote their interests in the modern sector.

3. The degree of ethnic segregation in the city. Insofar as housing policies promote the spatial clustering of persons of similar ethnic background, they will tend to form ethnic organizations.[82]

4. The degree to which urban land tenure is regulated by customary law. When it is so regulated, the competition for land becomes a competition for a scarce resource whose allocation is governed by ethnic criteria. By contrast, as in central Africa, when urban land is leasehold, ethnic group membership is largely irrelevant in the allocation of this increasingly valuable commodity. The allocation of urban land by customary law thus promoted the formation of ethnic groupings.

A second set of factors influences the likelihood of the formation of ethnic groups under conditions of competition for the benefits of modernity; these factors are associated with the nature of urban-rural relations. As we have emphasized, ethnic groups appear to emerge when they can organize and promote a pattern of mutually reinforcing interactions between the city and the countryside. Several factors facilitate the emergence of this pattern.

1. It takes at least a modicum of surplus income to finance the export and education of manpower; and without the urban, educated moderns, ethnic groups do not emerge. Thus it is that rural cash cropping societies appear to be the ones which most often form ethnic groupings.

2. Secondly, fragmentary evidence suggests that the organization of labor in the rural society is also important. Where the organization of labor is such that the loss of rural manpower leads to a net decrease in rural income -- that is, a decrease in the quantity of marketable produce, and thus of revenues, that exceeds the revenues created by remittances from the urban sector -- then the cycling relationship between urban

immigration and rural income fails to materialize.[83] As we have indicated, this relationship is essential to the generation of expanding modern benefits and these expanding benefits are the source of support of ethnic organizations.

3. Thirdly, and by a similar argument, the severe overcrowding of land appears to promote the "cycling" relationship between the urban and rural sectors. Under conditions of overcrowding, the marginal product of the rural worker approaches zero. To release the worker to the urban area is therefore almost assuredly to secure a net increase in income which can then be organized in the manner outlined above. Thus it is that rural groups with high population densities, like the Ibo and Kikuyu, which appear to be peculiarly prone to the formation of ethnic groupings.

4. Moreover, the rural countryside must be sufficiently prosperous to attract moderns back to it. Generally, where ethnic organization form, they do so in rural societies characterized by the presence of young educateds; indeed, these persons often form the local cadres of the ethnic groups in the countryside.[84] But, unless the countryside is relatively prosperous, these persons will not reside there, and ethnic groups will not form.

5. A last factor appears to be crucial: the maintenance of relatively dense family networks between the city and the countryside. We have noted that the strength of ethnic obligations experienced by urban residents is a function of the magnitude of the kinship pressures to which they are exposed. A determinate of this magnitude is the number of kin in their urban environment. Where a rural society tends to disperse its

members among a wide range of cities, as opposed to concentrating them into a few major towns, then the sense of ethnic obligation is less likely to emerge. Thus, for example, Harries-Jones has noted the relative dispersion of close family relations of Zambian ethnic groups throughout the several copperbelt towns, and, contrasting this to patterns elsewhere in Africa, has related the phenomenon to the failure of organized ethnic groups to emerge in Zambian urban societies.[85]

The Politicization of Ethnic Competition

Several factors appear to be crucial in politicizing ethnic competition, and thus in obtaining the second level of intensity in ethnic competition.

1. The first and most obvious factor is the degree of competition allowed in the political sector. It is precisely because the independent states of Africa, in contrast to the colonial bureacracies, made provision for competititive politics that ethnic competition could become politicized in the post-colonial era. Moreover, it would appear probable that with the restrictions on political competition imposed by no-party, military regimes, ethnic competition will again become depoliticized; and we would then predict that it will be less intense than in the era of rival politicians, competing parties, and contested elections in Africa.

2. A second factor affecting the degree of politicization of ethnic competition is the magnitude of the revenues which the government disperses for development purposes. Insofar as the government is rich, the stakes

for controlling it are high, and the incentive to seize power is therefore strong. As a result, political competition between ethnic groups will increase. Moreover, insofar as the government allocates revenues for development purposes, the occasions for conflict increase: locational disputes concerning the citing of plants, roads, and projects, for example, multiply. Thus, for example, it is not surprising that a primary incentive for the emergence of ethnic conflict in previously tranquil Zambia was the sudden expansion of public revenues and the resultant growth of disputes over this allocation. With independence and the breakup of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the public revenues available to the government of Zambia expanded enormously; and debates concerning the distribution of these revenues led to a major split between the political leaders of the Bemba speakers and the leaders of other tribes. In the eyes of some, the Bemba had seemed to be prospering unduly from the patterns of public expenditure.

3. A third major factor influencing the politicization of ethnic conflict would appear to be the capacity of traditional political institutions to utilize modern resources and thereby perpetuate their political roles in the modern era. An examination of this phenomenon would require at least a book, and indeed at least two fine ones have recently been written.[86] We can therefore but mention this factor and emphasize its importance.

Competition to Conflict

The last major task is to specify the factors which transform

political competition into political conflict. Several crucial ones emerge from the cases we have considered.

1. The first is the quantity of modern resources that are available to be distributed among the competing ethnic groups. Thus, for example, the Council for Inter-Societal Studies of Northwestern University, in a major quantitative study, report a negative correlation between levels of modernization and communal instability in Africa.[87] Their measure of communal instability is the frequency of acts of coercion and violence: civil wars, communal rebellions, and irredentism. We regard these findings as suggesting that more modern societies can forestall ethnic conflict, or alternatively, better accommodate ethnic competition. An obvious explanation for this is that the more modern states of Africa are the ones which have successfully generated a large quantity of benefits to be distributed among the rival claimants for the goods of the modern era.

2. The second major factor is the intensity of political competition among ethnic groups. Our assumption is that political conflict becomes more probable the greater the intensity of political competition. The intensity of political competition among ethnic groups depends on the strength of the ethnic appeals made by rival politicians; the strength of these appeals, in turn, is a function of the relative size of the politicians' ethnic groups. We can represent a single politician's behavior in the following way. We define an ethnic appeal as involving (1) the slandering of other ethnic groups and (2) soliciting the support of one's own. We

assume an electoral system with a majority vote determining the outcome of the election, and the presence of only two parties per electoral district.

Two considerations are involved in devising an ethnic appeal: The need to win the support of other ethnic groups and the need to consolidate the support of one's own group. For a politician, both considerations are a function of the relative size of his own group. We can represent these considerations as curves.

The utility of appealing to other groups starts high; when the politician's own group is relatively small, he has no choice but to appeal for votes outside it. The utility remains high, for as the politican's own group approaches 51% of the constituency, the value of every vote in the constituency increases. However, once the politican's own group can ensure his election, he need but appeal to his own group and he can make such an appeal by attacking other groups. The curve therefore falls directly to zero.



Politician's Own Group as a Percentage of Constituency Population

The necessity of appealing to one's own group is never absent; and, intuitively, the utility of such an appeal would appear to be a direct function of the relative size of the group. The utility would naturally peak at the 51% mark, and then decline. The reason for the decline is that as the group approaches the total population of the constituency, appeals to sections of the group may become more useful in winning the constituency.



Combining the two curves yields the following composite curve, representing the predicted strength of a politican's ethnic appeals as a function of the relative size of his group. We add ten to all scores so as to avoid having negative scores when the candidate is appealing both to his own group and to others.



By this reasoning, and assuming that ethnic conflict is most probable when ethnic political competition is the most intense, we would predict that ethnic conflict, under the political rules specified at the outset, is most likely where any one group constitutes around 50% of the membership of the political unit.

3. The third major factor is the degree of ethnic stratification in the society. Where any given ethnic group is ensconced in an elite political position, other things being equal, then the greater the probability that political competition among ethnic groups will lead to political violence. Much work needs to be done on this proposition, but I would nonetheless assert that the greater the degree to which ethnic political competition involves political restratificiation, the greater the likelihood of ethnic

competition intensifying into violence.

VII

We have argued that ethnic competition is related to modernization in Africa and that certain basic factors ensure this relationship. We have also argued that, in certain situations, ethnic groups can persist and prosper in the modern era. Lastly, we have suggested that there are degrees of ethnic competition, running from the absence of such competition to political violence, and we have indicated the factors that appear to influence the level of intensity that will be attained. In conclusion, what we have done is to suggest a way of looking at ethnic behavior that emphasizes that it is dynamic and rational behavior; that it represents an attempt to deal with, organize, and benefit from the modernization of societies; and that it can change and alter in intensity when subject to the influence of certain factors. We realize that our argument is but a beginning of an understanding of the phenomenon, and not an explanation of it. If, however, we have made the phenomenon amenable to theorizing, and amenable to the development of theories applicable in Africa, the United States, and elsewhere, then the paper will have served the purpose we intended.

NOTES

1. Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Old Societies and New States, ed. Clifford Geertz (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," American Political Science Review, 44, no. 4 (December 1970): 1112-1130. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

2. The seminal works in this vein are Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review 55, no. 3 (1961): 493-514 and Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1958). Lerner finds a high intercorrelation between urbanizayion, literacy, media participation, and political participation with aggregate data and a Guttman scale configuration for measures of literacy, urbanization, media participation, empathy, and political participation (as measured by opinion range) with individual data. For data from Africa, Edward Soja finds that district level measures in Kenya of education and urbanization, and various indicators of income load heavily on a single major factor. (Edward W. Soja, The Geography of Modernization in Kenya: A Spatial Analysis of Social, Economic, and Political Change (Syracuse University Press, 1968)).

3. For discussions of the definitional problems of the term, see Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization"; Pierre L. Van den Berghe, "Introduction," in Africa: Social Problems of Change and Conflict, ed. Pierre L. Van den Berghe (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1965); Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969); and Paul Mercier, "On the Meaning of 'Tribalism' in Black Africa," in Africa, ed. Pierre L. Van den Berghe, pp. 483-501.

To be noted is that to affirm the reality of ethnic groups is not to ignore their internal devisiveness. Conflicts between major segments and areal groupings, between commoners and persons of royal blood, and between clans and villages -- all these cleavages do exist. Nonetheless, internal conflicts do not necessarily weaken the capacity of the larger ethnic groups to mobilize their members for collective purposes; the conflict laden, internally divided Ibo are a case in point. The fact of internal division and conflict should therefore not be taken as evidence of the absence of effective ethnic collectivities nor discredit the validity of our enterprise.

4. One of the major social costs of modernization is the development of new stratification patterns, and thus the rise of inequality; another is the generation of new individual opportunities, and thus the opportunity for

pursuing self-interest at the expense of traditional social obligations. African Socialism, and its other variants, represent an attempt to speak to these problems. See William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds., African Socialism (Stanford: Stanford University Press for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1964); Julius K. Nyerere, Uhuru na Ujamaa: Freedom and Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); and Kenneth D. Kaunda, "Humanism in Zambia" in After Mulungushi: The Economics of Zambian Humanism, ed. Bastiaan de Gaay Fortman (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1969). For analyses of the relationship between social change and attempts to control witchcraft, see the contributions in John Middleton and E. H. Winter, eds., Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa (London: Routledge and Paul, 1963). See also the case of the Bakweri Cooperative Union of Farmers, where the prosperous cash crop growing peasantry diverted their earning into paying for the services of anti-witchcraft experts to defend against the jealousy of their less successful brethern (Shirley Ardener, "Banana Cooperatives in the Southern Cameroons" in Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1958), pp. 10-25).

5. See, for example, David B. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma of Popular Education: An African Case (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969). In Zambia in 1969, the absence of places in primary schools led to demonstrations in some of the townships in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt.

6. Thayer Scudder and Elizabeth Colson, "The Kariba Dam Project: Resettlement and Local Initiative" in Technical Innovation and Cultural Change, ed. M.H.R. Bernard and P. Pelto (New York: Macmillan, forthcoming).

7. See, for example, C. W. Barwell, "A Note on Some Changes in the Economy of the Kipsigis Tribe," Journal of African Administration 8, (1956): 95-101. For a discussion of the Kikuyu, see Edward W. Soja, The Geography of Modernization, p. 59. For other commentaries on the responsiveness of the peasantry to economic incentives, see Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study in Rural Capitalism (Cambridge: The University Press, 1963) and R. Galletti, K. D.S. Baldwin, and I. O. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers: An Economic Survey of Yoruba Cocoa Farming Families (London: Published on Behalf of the Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board by Oxford University Press, 1956).

8. P. H. Gulliver, "The Conservative Commitment in Northern Tanzania," in Tradition and Transition in East Africa: Studies of the Tribal Element in the Modern Era, ed. P. H. Gulliver (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 223-242.

9. Philip H. Gulliver, "Incentives in Labor Migration," in Africa, ed. Pierre L. Van den Berghe, p. 431. See also, Elizabeth Colson, "Migration in Africa: Trends and Possibilities," in Social Change: The Colonial Situation, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 107-113 and J. Clyde Mitchell, "Wage Labour and African Population

Movements in East Africa," in Essays on African Population, ed. K. M. Barbour and R. M. Prothero (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), pp. 193-248. For two excellent bibliographic essays on this topic, see Josef Gugler, "The Impact of Labour Migration of Society and Economy in Sub-Saharan Africa: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Considerations," African Social Research 7 (1968): 463-486 and Sara S. Berry, "The Marketing of Labor Services in African Cities: A Relatively Unexplored Topic," African Urban Notes 5, no. 3 (1970): 144-153.

10. Figures from the data collected by the Council for Inter-Societal Studies, Northwestern University. The figures represent the percentage increase in the population of cities of 20,000 or more residents. As with all quantitative data, these must be treated with caution. For example, it is probable that in the case of Malawi, the population of a single town passed beyond the 20,000 mark during this period, with the result that all of a sudden over 20,000 people were added to the urban population; given the small number of people previously counted as urban, the effect of a small change in the population of this town could produce a massive change in the urbanization figure. Nonetheless, as with all statistics, while specific figures can be unreliable, the general tendency which they indicate can be reliable, and the general tendency toward rapid urbanization in Africa is indisputably strong.

11. The economic theory has been most vigorously counterpoised against the "bright lights" theory by Philip H. Gulliver in his "Incentives in

Labor Migration." Studies in Kenya suggest that it is the perceived probability of employment, rather than the actual demand for labor, which influences the rate of urban migration (Michael P. Todaro, "A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries," American Economic Review 59, no. 1 (1969): 138-148). Also, John C. Caldwell, African Rural-Urban Migration: The Movement to Ghana's Towns (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

12. Elizabeth Colson, "The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights," in Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule, ed. Victor Turner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), p. 194.

13. Appendix V. 3 in Polly Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers. See also the accounts contained in David Brokensha, Social Change at Larteh, Ghana (Oxford: Clarendon, 1966). See also the account of the Gisu penetration of cash croppers into Sebei in Michael Twaddle, "'Tribalism' in Eastern Uganda," in Tradition and Transition, ed. P.H. Gulliver, pp. 193-208 and of the dispute between the Ofesi Odo and the Agba Enu in Akwa, Eastern Nigeria in L. T. Chubb, Ibo Land Tenure (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1961), pp. 42ff.

14. For one of the numerous discussions of the origins of this dispute, see A. W. Southall, "Population Movements in East Africa," in Essays on African Population, ed. K.M. Barbour and R. M. Prothero, pp. 157-192.

15. Thus, Southall and Gutkind state "It would indeed be extraordinary if the landowners quietly watched tenants on their land make larger profits, while they themselves /had received/ little more than a pittance . . ." (Aidan W. Southall and Peter C. W. Gutkind, Townsmen in the Making: Kampala and its Suburbs (Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1957), p. 118). For other examples, see P. C. Lloyd, "Tribalism in Warri," in West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Fifth Annual Conference Proceedings, March 1956 (Ibadan: University College, 1956), pp. 79-87 and the accounts of the Gisu's conflict with the Ganda and Bagwere for control of Mbale contained in J.S. Lafontaine, "Tribalism among the Gisu, and Anthropological Approach" in Tradition and Transition in East Africa, ed. P.H. Gulliver, pp. 177-192 and Michael Twaddle, " 'Tribalism' in Eastern Uganda," Ibid., pp. 193-208. See also the discussion of Onitsha and Ibadan politics contained in Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 150ff and 285ff.

16. Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa; G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers (London: Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press, 1963) and G. I. Jones, "The Political Organization of Old Calabar," in Efik Traders of Old Calabar, ed. Daryll Forde (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall for the International African Institute, 1968); P. C. Lloyd, "Tribalism in Warri."

17. See J.M. Lonsdale, "Political Associations in Western Kenya," in Protest and Power in Black Africa, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 589-638, and Dharam P. Ghai, "The Bugandan Trade Boycott: A Study in Tribal, Political, and Economic Nationalsim" in Ibid., pp. 755-770.

18. David J. Parkin, "Tribe as Fact and Fiction in an East African City," in Tradition and Transition in East Africa, ed. P.H. Gulliver, pp. 273-296 and R.D. Grillo, "The Tribal Factor in an East African Trade Union," in Ibid., pp. 297-321.

19. Willard R. Johnson, "The Union des Populations du Cameroun in Rebellion: The Integrative Backlash of Insurgency," in Protest and Power in Black Africa, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, pp. 671-692. Gwendolen M. Carter, Independence for Africa (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), especially Chapter 10. And "Domestic Violence in the Congo," in Issues of Political Development, Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), pp. 120-142.

20. See, for example, Philip J. Foster, "Secondary School-Leavers in Ghana: Expectation and Reality," Harvard Educational Review 34(1964): 537-558 and Philip Foster, Education and Social Change in Ghana (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); David B. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma, pp. 193-208; and Archibald Callaway, "Unemployment among

African School Leavers," Journal of Modern African Studies 1, no. 3 (1963): 351-371 and "Education Expansion and the Rise of Youth Unemployment," in The City of Ibadan, ed. P.C. Lloyd, A.L. Mabogunje, and E. Awe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press with the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, 1967), pp. 191-211. An interesting finding that perhaps underscores the proclivity for job competition among African school leavers is that in Zambia, African students give a much higher rating to the occupation of "employment officer" than do Europeans thereby perhaps indicating the intensity of their desire for employment; see R.E. Hicks, "Similarities and Differences in Occupational Prestige Ratings: A Comparative Study of Two Cultural Groups in Zambia," African Social Research no. 3 (1967): 223.

21. Philip Foster, Education and Social Change and R.E. Hicks, "Similarities and Differences."

22. N. Xydias, "Prestige of Occupations," in Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara, ed. Daryll Forde (Paris: UNESCO 1956), pp. 458-469.

23. R.E. Hicks, "Occupational Prestige and its Factors: A Study of Zambia Railway Workers," African Social Research no. 1 (1966): 44-58. See also J. Clyde Mitchell and A.L. Epstein, "Occupational Prestige and Social Status among Africansin Northern Rhodesia," Africa 29(1959): 22-40 and J.C. Mitchell and S.H. Irvine, "Social Position and the Grading of Occupations," Rhodes-Livingstone Journal 38(1965): 42-54.

24. P. C. Lloyd, "The Development of Political Parties in Western Nigeria," American Political Science Review 49, no. 3 (1955): 693-707, especially p. 695; P. C. Lloyd, "Some Modern Changes in the Government of Yoruba Towns," in the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference (Ibadan: University College, 1953), pp. 7-20; and P. C. Lloyd, "The Changing Role of Yoruba Traditional Leaders," in the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference (Ibadan: University College, 1956), pp. 57-65. Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); especially his discussion of the struggle between the asafu societies and the chiefs in Ashanti.

Caldwell, in his study of returned urban migrants in Ghana, and Post, in his study of elections in the Eastern Region of Nigeria, clearly suggest the prestige given the urbanized and educated by the less modernized rural populations. See John C. Caldwell, African Rural-Urban Migration, p. 143 and K. W. J. Post, The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959 (London: Published for the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research by Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 376-436. See also Allen F. Hershfield, "Ibo Sons Abroad: A Window on the World," (Paper prepared for presentation at Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, October 15-18, 1969).

For general discussions of elite formation, see P. C. Lloyd, The New Elites of Tropical Africa (London: Published for the International African Institute by the Oxford University Press, 1966); P. Morton Williams, "A Discussion of the Theory of Elites in a West African (Yoruba) Context," in the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference (Ibadan: University College, 1956), pp. 25-32; Gordon M. Wilson, "The African Elite," in The Transformation of East Africa, ed. Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke, pp. 431-461; and Paul Mercier, "Evolution of Senegalese Elites" and Pius Ikigbo, "Social Consequences of Economic Development in West Africa," in Africa, ed. Pierre L. Van den Berghe, pp. 163-178 and 415-426, respectively.

25. J. S. La Fontaine, "Tribalism among the Gisu," Michael Twaddle, "'Tribalism' in Eastern Uganda," and Kathleen M. Stahl, "The Chagga," in Tradition and Transition in East Africa, ed. P. H. Gulliver; J. M. Lonsdale, "Political Association in Western Kenya," in Protest and Power in Black Africa, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui.

26. See, for example, Richard L. Sklar's discussion of the new class in Ibadan in his Nigerian Political Parties; Plotnicov's discussion of Jos in Social Stratification in Africa, ed. Arthur Tuden and Leonard Plotnicov (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 269-302; Pon's discussion of the evolués in Kisangani in Valdo Pons, Stanleyville: An African Urban Community Under Belgian Administration (London: Published for the International African Institute by Oxford University Press, 1969); P. C. Lloyd's discussion of "The Elite" in The City of Ibadan, ed. P. C. Lloyd

A. L. Mabongunje, and B. Awe, pp. 129-150; and J. S. La Fontaine, City Politics: A Study of Leopoldville 1962-63 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1970).

27. W. T. Morrill, "Immigrants and Associations: The Ibo in Twentieth Century Calabar," in Immigrants and Associations, ed. L. A. Fallers (The Hague: Mouton and Company, 1967).

28. T. M. Baker, "Political Control Among the Birom," in West African Institute for Social and Economic Research, Fifth Annual Conference Proceedings, March 1956 (Ibadan: University College, 1956), p. 94.

29. P. C. Lloyd, "Tribalism in Warri"; Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 285; and Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, Issues of Political Development, pp. 31-33.

30. See the discussion by Fred G. Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," in The Transformation of East Africa, ed. Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke, and by Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya," Journal of Modern African Studies 7, no. 4 (1969): 689-711. For one of the most incisive treatments of the resultant political alignments, see Edward W. Soja, The Geography of Modernization in Kenya, pp. 102ff.

31. See, for example, the discussions contained in Martin L. Kilson, Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernization Process in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966); Willard R. Johnson, The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970);

J. Gus Liebenow, "Liberia," in African One-Party States, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962); and Aristide R. Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

32. See, for example, the discussion in George Bennett "Tribalism in Politics," in Tradition and Transition, ed. P. H. Gulliver, pp. 59-87.

33. Aristide R. Zolberg, One-Party Government, p. 5.

34. Ibid., p. 7.

35. Akinsola A. Akiwowo, "The Sociology of Nigerian Tribalism," Phylon 23(1964): 162.

36. Some interesting work has been done on the effects of status inconsistency on hostility and violence, particularly in the field of international relations. See, for example, Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," Journal of Peace Research no. 2(1964): 95-119 and Raymond Tanter, "Status and Influence Attempts in International Politics," (Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington D. C., 2-6 September 1969).

37. For an interesting analogy, see T. H. Marshall's analysis of the use of citizenship to gain social and economic rights in the industrial nations of the west (T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964)).

38. Michael F. Lofchie, "The Zanzabari Revolution: African Protest in a Racially Plural Society," in Protest and Power, ed. Robert I. Rotberg

and Ali A. Mazrui, pp. 924-967; René Lemarchand, "The Coup in Rwanda," in Ibid., pp. 877-923; and Martin R. Doornboos, "Kumanyana and Rwenzuru: Two Responses to Ethnic Inequality," in Ibid., pp. 1088-1136. Sklar, in a variant of our hypothesis, notes the pattern of incongruities in Nigeria:

> I have suggested that the political system of the first Nigerian Republic was undermined by an acute contradiction between the constitutional allocation of power and the real distribution of power in society. The constitution gave dominant power to the numerical majority--i.e., to the dominant party of the Northern Region--while the real distribution of power is determined by technological and educational development, in which respect the southern regions are far superior. Since the dominant party of the North was determined to hold power at all costs, a political upheavel was likely to occur.

Richard L. Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective," Government and Opposition 2, no. 4 (1967): 527.

39. See, for example, Peter R. Gould, "Problems of Structuring and Measuring Spatial Changes in the Modernization Process: Tanzania 1920-1963," (Paper prepared for delivery at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D. C., 2-7 September, 1968); Edward W. Soja, The Geography of Modernization in Kenya; and David J. Siddle, "Rural Development in Zambia: A Spatial Analysis," Journal of Modern African Studies, 8, no. 2 (1969): 271-284.

40. Edward W. Soja, The Geography of Modernization in Kenya, pp. 49-62. See also Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya."

41. See, for example, James S. Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 27ff and David B. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma, p. 38.

42. Nelson Kasfir, "The Decline of Cultural Subnationalism in Uganda,"

(Unpublished Manuscript, 1969), p. 28.

43. Ibid.

44. Josef Gugler, "The Impact of Labour Migration," p. 465.

45. Elizabeth Colson, "The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights."

46. James S. Coleman, Nigeria, p. 59; L. T. Chubb, Ibo Land Tenure, p. 25.

47. P. C. Lloyd, "Tribalism in Warri," p. 86. See also J. S. La Fontaine, "Tribalism among the Gisu" and J. M. Lonsdale, "Political Association in Western Kenya."

48. Our point here is made also by Sklar in his argument that ethnic conflict is conducted in terms of gesellschaft principles at the elite level and in terms of gemeinschaft principles at the level of the masses. See, for example, Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "Nigeria," in Political Parties and National Integration, ed. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 620 and Richard L. Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration -- A Radical Approach," Journal of Modern African Studies 5, no. 1 (1967): 1-11.

49. J. M. Lonsdale, "Political Associations in Western Kenya," p. 628; Michael Twaddle, " 'Tribalism' in Eastern Uganda," p. 197; and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. and John Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau Mau": Nationalism in Kenya (New York: Frederick A. Praeger for the Hoover Institution on

War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966), pp. 105-135. Also to be noted is that the leaders of the first actual "tribal" government among the Birom were from the first chieftancies to allow education in the area (T. M. Baker, "Political Control Among the Birom," pp. 90-91).

50. S. Ottenberg, "Improvement Associations among the Afikpo Ibo," Africa 25, 1 (1955): 4.

51. Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, p. 72.

52. George Bennett, "Tribalism in Politics," in Tradition and Transition, ed. P.H. Gulliver, p. 80.

53. E.P. Oyeaka Offodile, "Growth and Influence of Tribal Unions," The West African Review (Liverpool) 18, no. 2 (1947): 937.

54. See, for example, J.S. La Fontaine, City Politics, p. 192.

55. S. Ottenberg, "Improvement Associations," pp. 15-16.

56. See, for example, the analysis of departmental employment practices in the East African Railways depot in Kampala contained in R.D. Grillo, "The Tribal Factor in an East African Trade Union," in Tradition and Transition, ed. P.H. Gulliver, and the description of the procedures for getting jobs contained in C. Okonjo, "Stranger Communities: The Western Ibo," in The City of Ibadan, ed. P.C. Lloyd, A.L. Mabogunje, and B. Awe.

57. See, for example, Jean L. Comhaire, "Economic Change and the Extended Family," in Africa, ed. Pierre L. Van den Berghe: the studies of expenditures contained in Peter C. Garlick, "The Matrilineal Family

System and Business Enterprise" in Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Conference Proceedings, December 1958 (Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, n.d.) and in John C. Caldwell, Population Growth and Family Change in Africa: The New Urban Elite in Ghana (New York: Humanities Press for the Australian National University Press, 1968), pp. 61-106.

See also the numerous discussions of "the failure of class formation" in Africa which underscore the extent of the use of kinship networks to extract the benefits accruing to the more modern elements of society. For example, P. Mercier, "Problems of Social Stratification in West Africa," in Social Change: The Colonial Situation, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein, pp. 340-358; and the "Introduction" to Social Stratification in Africa, ed. Arthur Tuden and Leonard Plotnicov, pp. 18-19. See also the references in note 33.

58. See, for example, P.C. Lloyd, "The Elite," in The City of Ibadan, ed. P.C. Lloyd, A.L. Mabogunje, and B. Awe, pp. 129-150; John C. Caldwell, African Rural-Urban Migration, p. 130; Jean L. Comhaire, "Economic Change and the Extended Family," p. 121; and Alasdair C. Sutherland, "Private Enterprise of Social and Economic Research, Proceedings of the Fourth Annual Conference (Ibadan: University College, 1956), pp. 119-125.

59. R.D. Grillo, "The Tribal Factor in an East African Trade Union,"

in Tradition and Transition, ed. P. H. Gulliver, p. 318.

60. Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya," pp. 699-701.

61. David B. Abernethy, The Political Dilemma, pp. 107-108.

62. See, for example, Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 28-37.

63. See the discussion in Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

64. See the discussion in Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960; Michael F. Lofchie, "The Zanzibari Revolution: African Protest in a Racially Plural Society," in Protest and Power, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, pp. 924-967; René Lemarchand, "The Coup in Rwanda," in Protest and Power, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, pp. 877-923; and James Maquet, "Rwanda Castes," in Social Stratification in Africa, ed. Arthur Tuden and Leonard Plotnicov, pp. 93-124.

65. For discussions of pre-electoral ethnicity in Zambia, see J. Clyde Mitchell, The Kalela Dance: Aspects of Social Relationships among Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia, The Rhodes-Livingston Papers, no. 27 (Lusaka: The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia, 1956); A. L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community (Manchester: Manchester University Press on Behalf of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia, 1958); and Max Gluckman, "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa," Cahiers d'etudes africaines 1, no. 1 (1960): 55-70.

For the effect of electoral politics on ethnicity in Zambia, see David C. Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Robert I. Rotberg, "Tribalism and Politics in Zambia," Africa Report 12 (1967): 29-35; Ian Scott and Robert Molteno, "The Zambian General Elections," Africa Report 14 (1969): 42-46; and Margaret Rouse Bates, "UNIP in Postindependence Zambia: The Development of an Organizational Role" (Ph. D. dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University, 1971).

66. Richard L. Sklar, "Political Science and National Integration--A Radical Approach," p. 6. As noted in one study in Uganda, the politicians strive to create ethnic unity where none existed before: "it is not always clear whether an ethnic group is united or whether its leaders are simply putting forward claims in the hopes of galvanizing potential members. . . . In a survey among rural Iteso carried out in 1956 asking who was the leader of the Iteso people, over 50% of the respondents stated there was none. The political elite of Teso, however, called for union of all Iteso in Kenya and Uganda, purging the language of Luganda words, and giving traditional names to 35 towns." Nelson Kasfir, "The Decline of Cultural Subnationalism," p. 13.

67. Victor C. Uchendu, The Igbo of Southeast Nigeria (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), p. 9.

68. M. Mainza Chona, "Who is Responsible for Tribalism?" Zambia Mail

5 May 1968; see also "Chona Lashes out at Zambia's Tribalists," Zambia Mail, 28 December 1970.

69. For example, see E. P. Oyeaka Offodile, "Growth and Influence of Tribal Unions," for a descripton of the levying of educational funds by the Ibo State Union and Allan F. Hershfield, "Ibo Sons Abroad," for an analysis of the contribution of urban dwellers to the construction of civic facilities in rural villages. See also the discussion of the impact on rural development of financial contributions from the urban dwellers in John C. Caldwell, African Rural-Urban Migration, pp. 160ff.

70. E. P. Oyeaka Offodile, "Growth and Influence of Tribal Unions," p. 941.

71. P. C. Lloyd, "Tribalism in Warri," p. 86.

72. Leonard Plotnicov, "The Modern African Elite of Jos, Nigeria," in Social Stratification in Africa, ed. Arthur Tuden and Leonard Plotnicov, p. 289.

73. For the Lozi case, see Ian Scott and Robert Molteno, "The Zambian General Elections"; for Tanzania "September Elections are Lively," Africa Report 10, no. 9 (1965): 17 and Ruth Schachter Morgenthau, "African Elections: Tanzania's Contribution," Africa Report 10, no. 11 (1965): 12-17; "Kenya's New Cabinet," Africa Report 15, no. 4 (1970): 8-9 and "Some Ministers, Many M.P.'s Defeated in Election," Africa Diary 10, no. 3 (1970): 4788-4789.

74. R. E. Hicks, "Similarities and Differences," p. 213.

75. Ibid., p. 219 discussing Philip Foster, Education and Social Change.

76. Shirley G. Ardener, "The Social and Economic Significance of the Contribution Club among a Section of the Southern Ibo," in the West African Institute of Social and Economic Research, Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference (Ibadan: University College, 1953), p. 142. See also the comments on title taking in the Awzaw order made in G. T. Basden, Among the Ibos of Nigeria (New York: Barnes and Noble Inc., 1966), p. 265. Plotnicov noted "an efforescence of traditional title-taking among urban Ibo" in Jos during the period prior to the civil war (Leonard Plotnicov, comments on A. L. Epstein, "Urbanization and Social Change in Africa," in The City in Newly Developing Countries, ed. Gerald Breese (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1969), p. 273). Sklar notes the tendency toward title-taking among the Yoruba and relates it to the elite's desire to recruit ethnic support (Richard L. Sklar, Nigerian Political Parties, pp. 107-110). For a commentary on this practice which is very close to the one here, note Victor C. Uchendu, The Igbo, pp. 92-93.

77. Lloyd notes the renewed attractiveness of traditional offices in the Western Region of Nigeria in P. C. Lloyd, "The Changing Role of Traditional Leaders." Whitaker notes the tendency of those with high positions in modern society to utilize their resources to achieve higher offices in traditional political structures. See, for example, C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "A Dysrhythmic Process of Political Change." Plotnicov notes the same pattern in Jos (Leonard Plotnicov, "The Modern African Elite of Jos, Nigeria," p. 280).

78. Georges Balandier, "Traditional Social Structures and Economic Changes," in Africa, ed. Pierre L. Van den Berghe, pp. 392-393. For a discussion of the practice of clientage by moderns see C. S. Whitaker, Jr., The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 374ff and the discussion of the post-coup era in Rwanda by René Lemarchand, "The Coup in Rwanda," in Protest and Power, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui, pp. 877-923. As for the financing of ceremonials, see, for example, P. C. Lloyd, "Some Modern Changes in the Government of Yoruba Towns," p. 14 and R. Galletti, K. D. S. Baldwin, and I. O. Dina, Nigerian Cocoa Farmers, pp. 523ff.

79. Richard L. Sklar, "Nigerian Politics in Perspective," p. 528.

80. John C. Caldwell, African Rural-Urban Migration, p. 83.

81. John C. Caldwell, Population Growth and Family Change in Africa, p. 106.

82. I treat the effect of these factors in Robert H. Bates, "Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity," Cahiers d'etudes africaines 10, no. 40 (1970): 546-561.

83. Contrast, for example, the findings of Audrey I. Richards, Land, Labour, and Diet in Northern Rhodesia (London: Published for the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures, 1939) with those of W. Watson, Tribal Cohesion in a Money Economy: a Study of the Mambwe People of Northern Rhodesia (Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia, 1958). Also relevant is Godfrey Wilson, An Essay on the Economics of Detribalization in Northern Rhodesia, Rhodes-Livingstone Papers nos. 5 and 6 (Lusaka: Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, 1941 and 1942).

84. See, for example, the tendency of educated Nigerians to dwell in the rural areas, stressed by James S. Coleman, Nigeria, pp. 144-155. No doubt, this tendency is related to the degree of cash cropping in that country. The propensity of the rural educateds to serve as ethnic advisors has been noted in K. W. J. Post in The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959 in his chapter entitled "The Voting Decision." In the case of the Kikuyu, the density of educateds in the rural areas is stressed by Edward W. Soja, The Geography of Modernization, pp. 62ff.

85. Peter Harries-Jones, "'Home-boy' ties and Political Organization in a Copperbelt Township," in Social Networks in Urban Situations, ed. J. Clyde Mitchell (Manchester: Manchester University Press for the Institute for Social Research, the University of Zambia, 1969), pp. 297-347.

86. Martin L. Kilson, Political Change in a West African State and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., The Politics of Tradition.

87. See Lynn F. Fischer, Robert C. Mitchell, Donald G. Morrison, and Hugh M. Stevenson, "Modernization and Political Instability in Africa; An Empirical Assessment of Macro Theory," (Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, 18 October 1969). See also John N. Paden, "Modernization, Stability, and National Integration in Africa," (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Washington D. C., 3-7 September 1968).